For nearly half a century, the United States has treated the Middle East as a region from which it could neither safely withdraw nor comfortably remain. American presidents have protected oil routes, armed monarchies, defended Israel, fought terrorist organizations, contained Iran, invaded Iraq, bombed Syria and attempted peace negotiations that repeatedly collided with the ambitions of the governments involved.

The region entering the 2030s will be different from the one Washington inherited in 1980. The United States imports far less Persian Gulf oil than it once did. Israel is richer, more heavily armed and increasingly capable of financing its own defense. Saudi Arabia wants to become a global investment, tourism and technology center while preserving an absolute monarchy that restricts speech, religion and political participation. China has become the leading customer for much of the region’s energy and an increasingly credible diplomatic partner.

Syria offers the most unsettling preview of the new order. President Ahmed al-Sharaa once commanded a movement rooted in al Qaeda’s Syrian branch. He now receives diplomats, wears a suit, promises pluralism and presides over a government that Western and Arab capitals have rapidly moved to recognize. His rehabilitation may prove to be a practical accommodation with reality. It may also become one of the most consequential acts of political laundering in modern Middle Eastern diplomacy.

The central question is no longer whether Middle Eastern governments share American values. Most do not. The question is whether their conduct produces enough measurable benefit to justify American protection, weapons, diplomatic cover and financial support. By the 2030s, alliances based on inherited sentiment and personal assurances will become more difficult to defend. Washington will need treaties that are enforced, aid that purchases identifiable results and partnerships that can survive the rulers who negotiated them.

The Doctrine America Inherited

The modern American commitment to the Persian Gulf was stated with unusual clarity in January 1980. After the Iranian Revolution, the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter declared that any outside attempt to control the Gulf would be treated as an attack on the vital interests of the United States and repelled, if necessary, “including military force.” That commitment, later called the Carter Doctrine, transformed the Gulf from an important source of oil into a formal American security interest. Carter’s address also described the Egyptian and Israeli peace treaty as a strategic American asset.

The following decade demonstrated both the reach and the limits of that commitment. The Reagan administration deployed Marines to Lebanon during its civil war, attempted to strengthen the Lebanese state and became entangled among Israel, Syria, Palestinian organizations, sectarian militias and Iranian backed forces. The 1983 Beirut barracks bombing killed 241 American service members and helped persuade Washington to withdraw. The State Department’s historical account of the intervention shows how quickly a limited peacekeeping mission became vulnerable to local actors whose objectives bore little resemblance to Washington’s.

The 1991 Persian Gulf War appeared to offer a more successful model. The United States assembled an international coalition, expelled Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait and preserved the territorial order without occupying Iraq or overthrowing its government. Operation Desert Storm’s ground campaign lasted approximately 100 hours, reinforcing the impression that American military power could restore regional stability at a manageable cost.

That confidence helped produce the opposite result twelve years later. Congress authorized President George W. Bush to use force against Iraq in 2002, empowering him to defend the United States from the alleged Iraqi threat and enforce United Nations resolutions. The authorization became the legal foundation for the 2003 invasion, which overthrew Saddam but dismantled the state, empowered Iran, inflamed sectarian warfare and created conditions from which the Islamic State eventually emerged.

By the time American forces were again fighting across Iraq and Syria, the original bargain had changed. Washington was no longer merely protecting oil. It was containing the consequences of previous interventions, defending governments dependent on American security, fighting terrorist organizations born from regional collapse and attempting to prevent Iran from converting weak Arab states into extensions of its military power.

Why the Region Still Matters After American Oil Dependence Fell

The United States can reduce its military exposure to the Middle East, but geography prevents the region from becoming irrelevant. The Strait of Hormuz carried approximately 20 million barrels of oil each day in 2024, equal to about one fifth of global petroleum consumption. It also carried roughly one fifth of global trade in liquefied natural gas. American imports through the strait had fallen to about 500,000 barrels a day, only 2 percent of domestic petroleum consumption, yet a disruption would still raise prices throughout the global market and damage major American allies and trading partners. More than four fifths of the crude oil, condensate and liquefied natural gas moving through Hormuz went to Asia.

This distinction will shape American policy during the 2030s. The United States is less dependent on Gulf oil, while the world economy remains heavily dependent on Gulf shipping. Washington therefore has a continuing interest in open sea lanes, but that interest does not automatically justify protecting every regime, funding every partner or intervening in every internal war.

The region also remains central to nuclear proliferation, terrorism, commercial aviation, global shipping and the security of Europe, Africa and South Asia. A collapsed Syrian state can produce refugee movements into Europe. A war involving Iran can disrupt energy markets in East Asia. Attacks near the Red Sea can divert ships around Africa. Israeli and Palestinian violence can mobilize political movements thousands of miles away.

The Middle East matters because its crises travel. That reality supports a continuing American presence, though a more selective one than the sprawling system built after 1980.

The Making of President Ahmed al-Sharaa

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s public transformation is extraordinary even by the standards of Middle Eastern politics. Under the name Abu Mohammed al Jawlani, he led Jabhat al-Nusra, which the United States regarded as al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. In 2017, the State Department offered a reward for information about him, describing him as the leader of an organization responsible for kidnappings and attacks during the Syrian war.

Al-Sharaa eventually broke publicly with al-Qaeda, reorganized his movement and established Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as the dominant power in northwestern Syria. His defenders now point to that separation as proof of ideological evolution. Yet reorganization did not immediately produce liberal rule. A United Nations investigation found that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham pillaged abandoned homes, detained, tortured and executed civilians who expressed dissent, including journalists, and systematically discriminated against women and girls. United Nations investigators concluded that acts committed by its members amounted to war crimes.

That record cannot be erased by a change of name, clothing or diplomatic status. It also should not be distorted. The available evidence does not prove that every crime in territory under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was personally ordered by al-Sharaa, nor does it establish that political evolution is impossible. It does establish that he commanded an authoritarian Islamist movement whose institutions committed grave abuses. The burden rests on his government to demonstrate that the coercive methods used in Idlib have not merely been transferred into the Syrian state.

His rise was accelerated by the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024. Assad left behind a devastated country, a shattered economy, enormous displacement, communal distrust and institutions designed for dictatorship rather than public service. Al-Sharaa’s forces took Damascus with an existing command structure while most potential civilian rivals possessed little comparable organization.

The result was less a conventional democratic revolution than the national expansion of the strongest surviving opposition authority. Former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leaders entered the defense and interior ministries. Other armed factions were absorbed into the new military while retaining portions of their former command structures and autonomy. United Nations investigators found that former opposition fighters entered the new security forces without adequate human rights vetting.

This is the central danger surrounding al-Sharaa. His speeches may have changed faster than the institutions beneath him.

The Syrian Congress and the Limits of Managed Inclusion

The Syrian National Dialogue Conference, convened in Damascus in February 2025, was presented as the foundation of a new national order. Hundreds of participants discussed constitutional government, personal liberty, civil society, transitional justice and the economy. The closing declaration endorsed justice, freedom, equality, freedom of expression and “peaceful coexistence between all components of Syrian society.” Al-Sharaa called the transition an “exceptional, historic and rare opportunity.” Participants also called for a committee to draft a new constitution.

Those commitments deserve attention, but the conference contained structural weaknesses from the beginning. Its organizers excluded the Kurdish led administration controlling much of northeastern Syria, even while claiming to represent the country’s social and political diversity. The preparatory committee also lacked meaningful Druze and Alawite representation, while five of its seven members belonged to or were close to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Organizers said individual Kurds could participate while excluding the Kurdish governing authority itself.

The constitutional declaration that followed established a five year transition and formally incorporated rights found in international human rights treaties. Yet it also concentrated authority in the executive, left institutional oversight weak and placed former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham figures in central government positions. Only one woman entered the cabinet. Some Kurdish and Druze leaders rejected the arrangement as insufficiently representative. The United Nations described both the improvements and the persistent concentration of power, noting that media freedom widened, mandatory conscription ended and millions of former travel restrictions were lifted.

The conference therefore cannot yet be dismissed as pure fraud, but neither can it be accepted as proof of pluralism. It created language that Syrians and foreign governments can use to measure the new regime. Its credibility depends on whether those words become enforceable constraints on the presidency.

Real pluralism would require an independent legislature, competitive political organizations, religious freedom, equal citizenship, civilian control of armed factions, public budgeting, a judiciary capable of ruling against the government and elections whose outcomes are not determined in advance. A gathering chosen and managed by the ruling power may broaden consultation. It does not by itself transfer power to the public.

The Atrocities Under the New Syrian State

The harshest test arrived almost immediately. Large scale violence struck Alawite communities in Syria’s coastal and central regions in March 2025 after fighters loyal to the former government attacked the new security forces. Government personnel, allied fighters and private armed men killed civilians, tortured detainees, abducted residents and destroyed property. Later violence in Suwayda engulfed Druze and Bedouin communities.

A 2026 United Nations report found that government armed forces and individuals operating near them killed more than 1,400 people during the coastal violence, predominantly Alawite civilians. More than 1,500 people were killed during the Suwayda fighting, where government forces, Druze armed groups and tribal fighters committed acts amounting to war crimes. The report emphasized that responsibility extended across several armed parties.

The evidence requires precision. United Nations investigators did not find proof that al-Sharaa’s government had adopted a central policy or plan to massacre civilians during the coastal violence. They did find a systematic pattern of killing across numerous locations and warned that particular factions or groups may have followed an organized policy. The investigators called for accountability regardless of affiliation or rank.

That finding prevents two convenient narratives. Al-Sharaa cannot credibly claim that the violence was merely a collection of unrelated excesses beyond the state’s concern. Governments are responsible for the forces they recruit, arm, integrate and deploy. Critics, however, cannot honestly claim that investigators established a presidential order for mass killing when they found no evidence of such a plan.

The question is whether Syria will prosecute perpetrators from the victorious factions with the same determination it applies to former Assad officials. The new authorities have begun proceedings involving figures from the old state. Atef Najib, whose conduct helped ignite the 2011 uprising, appeared in court in May 2026, while cases connected to the Tadamun massacre and the Ghouta chemical attack also advanced. A United Nations Security Council briefing described these proceedings as important steps while stressing the need for due process.

Trials of Assad officials are necessary. Trials of victorious commanders will determine whether the process is justice or revenge.

How Washington Helped Rehabilitate the New Government

The international rehabilitation of al-Sharaa has moved faster than the consolidation of Syrian law. In June 2025, the White House terminated a broad structure of sanctions imposed on Syria, arguing that the circumstances underlying them had been transformed and citing “positive actions” by the new government. The order preserved restrictions on terrorist organizations, human rights abusers and figures linked to chemical weapons. The administration presented sanctions relief as a means of encouraging reconstruction and stability.

In November 2025, the United Nations Security Council removed al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the sanctions list associated with the Islamic State and al Qaeda. The resolution simultaneously reaffirmed the need to suppress al Qaeda, the Islamic State and associated groups.

These decisions were not declarations of innocence. They were political judgments that continued isolation could obstruct reconstruction, strengthen extremists and leave Syria vulnerable to renewed fragmentation. A state of more than twenty million people cannot be rebuilt while nearly every significant transaction remains exposed to sanctions.

Yet normalization becomes dangerous when access is treated as absolution. Washington and European capitals should distinguish between lifting restrictions that punish ordinary Syrians and granting personal legitimacy without conditions. Sanctions relief should be tied to minority protection, military vetting, independent monitoring, open trials, constitutional limits and access for international investigators.

Al-Sharaa may become a pragmatic national leader. He may also become an Islamist strongman who learned that Western recognition requires better language rather than better government. Only institutions can distinguish those possibilities.

Saudi Arabia’s Carefully Constructed Future

Saudi Arabia presents a more established version of the same problem. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has embarked on one of the most ambitious modernization programs in the world. Vision 2030 seeks to reduce dependence on oil, expand tourism, entertainment and technology, increase employment and turn the Public Investment Fund into a dominant global investor.

The original Vision 2030 document described the kingdom as “a tolerant country with Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method.” It promised transparency, accountability, opportunity for women and men, and an economy no longer vulnerable to commodity prices.

Parts of that transformation are real. Concerts, cinemas, sporting events and mass tourism have become normal features of a society that once restricted nearly every form of public entertainment. Women drive, work in a wider range of professions and participate more visibly in public life. Saudi leaders have curtailed some powers once exercised by religious authorities and opened the country to foreign business and visitors.

The mistake is to confuse social opening with political liberalization. Mohammed bin Salman is modernizing the kingdom from above while concentrating authority around himself. Citizens may enjoy broader choices in employment, travel and entertainment while possessing almost no meaningful power to challenge the government that grants them.

The 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul exposed the coercive machinery beneath the reform campaign. A declassified American intelligence assessment concluded that Mohammed bin Salman approved an operation to capture or kill Khashoggi. It based that conclusion on his control of Saudi decision making, the participation of his advisers and protective detail, and his support for violent measures against dissidents abroad. The assessment found it highly unlikely that such an operation could have occurred without his authorization.

Khashoggi’s murder was not merely a public relations failure. It demonstrated that a government presenting itself as a future oriented investment partner was prepared to use state resources against a journalist abroad. No number of sporting events, futuristic construction projects or celebrity partnerships can answer the institutional question raised by that killing: Who can restrain the crown prince when the crown prince controls the bodies responsible for investigating him?

Modernization Without Liberty

Saudi Arabia’s legal system continues to enforce a state interpretation of Islamic law that conflicts directly with Western principles of religious liberty, equal citizenship and freedom of expression. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom found that public non Muslim worship remained constitutionally prohibited, blasphemy and apostasy remained capital crimes, and religiously grounded guardianship rules continued to restrict women in marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance. It also documented long prison sentences, travel prohibitions and punishment for peaceful religious dissent. The commission recommended that Saudi Arabia remain designated a country of particular concern.

The death penalty remains central to the Saudi system. United Nations human rights experts reported that at least 356 people were executed in 2025, surpassing the previous annual record. The experts raised particular concern about executions for drug offenses and cases involving foreign nationals.

Claims that Saudi Arabia still practices legal chattel slavery would be inaccurate. Slavery is formally prohibited. Yet migrant workers remain vulnerable to trafficking, withheld wages, confiscated documents, abusive recruitment debts and restrictions imposed through employer sponsorship. The State Department’s 2025 trafficking report said Saudi authorities identified 536 victims, including 212 people subjected to labor trafficking and 262 subjected to forced begging or “slavery like practices.” The report also described continuing deficiencies in victim identification and worker protection.

This contradiction will define Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West. The kingdom wants American weapons, investors, universities, tourists and technology while rejecting the political system that produced them. Washington can cooperate with such a state, but it should stop pretending that commerce gradually guarantees liberty. Economic reform can strengthen an authoritarian government by giving it new revenue, surveillance tools and international prestige.

Saudi Arabia remains useful to the United States because of its energy capacity, intelligence networks, financial power, position in the Islamic world and ability to influence conflicts from Yemen to Syria. Usefulness, however, is not friendship, and it should never be confused with shared constitutional values.

The Actual Conflict Between Islamic Governance and the West

A serious examination of Islamic political values must distinguish among Muslims, Islamist organizations and governments claiming religious authority. Muslims living under secular constitutions do not share a single political program. Saudi religious law, Iranian clerical government, Turkish electoral nationalism, Syrian Islamist rule and the private faith of an American Muslim are not interchangeable.

The genuine conflict arises when any religious doctrine claims authority above the civil law governing everyone else. Liberal democracies protect religious belief while reserving coercive power to elected institutions and constitutional courts. Islamist movements often reverse that arrangement, treating divine law as superior to legislation and religious boundaries as limits on speech, sexuality, family law, conversion and criticism.

European governments have encountered this conflict most visibly through disputes involving religious clothing, blasphemy, education and public security. France’s 2004 secularism law prohibits students in public schools from wearing clothing or symbols that conspicuously display religious affiliation. The law applies formally to all religions, though controversy has focused heavily on Muslim head coverings.

Sweden faced a different collision after public burnings of the Quran generated furious protests abroad and threats against Swedish targets. The government said the reactions had worsened the national security environment and ordered agencies to intensify counterterrorism coordination. Swedish officials linked the heightened threat to the burnings and protests across the Muslim world.

The United Kingdom has also treated Islamist ideology as a distinct security problem. Following an independent review, the Home Office said Islamist terrorism remained the country’s primary and deadliest terrorist threat and ordered its Prevent program to focus more directly on ideological radicalization. The policy also required continued vigilance against extreme right terrorism and other violent movements.

These examples establish that cultural and ideological tensions are real. They do not prove that Muslims as a population owe no loyalty to Western countries or invariably place religion above citizenship. That sweeping claim cannot survive serious scrutiny. Millions of Muslims work, vote, serve in government, obey secular law and reject political violence.

Western states also contribute to social fragmentation when they permit residential isolation, tolerate extremist organizations, fail to enforce common civic standards or treat entire populations as permanently foreign. At the same time, Muslim residents face substantial discrimination. A European Union survey of 9,604 Muslims in thirteen countries found that 47 percent had experienced racial discrimination during the preceding five years, with particularly high rates in employment and housing. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights also found widespread harassment and discriminatory policing.

A workable Western policy should neither deny Islamist hostility nor assign collective guilt. It should demand one civil law, reject religious intimidation, protect conversion and criticism, punish violence, dismantle foreign financed extremist networks and treat citizens as individuals rather than representatives of an ancestral bloc.

Loyalty is demonstrated by conduct. It cannot be reliably inferred from ethnicity or religious identity.

The Myth That Arab Governments Cannot Keep Treaties

The claim that Arabs are inherently treacherous or naturally inclined to violate agreements is contradicted by the region’s most important diplomatic record. Governments break promises when rulers believe the costs of compliance exceed the costs of violation. That pattern is not ethnic. It is a recurring feature of international politics.

Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 after negotiations led by Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin. The agreement removed Egypt from the cycle of major Arab and Israeli wars and returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control. The treaty survived Sadat’s assassination, changes of government, uprisings, wars in Gaza and repeated political crises.

Jordan signed its own treaty with Israel in 1994. The agreement recognized the international boundary, established diplomatic relations and created security cooperation between two governments that continue to disagree sharply over Jerusalem, settlements and Palestinian statehood. The original treaty committed both parties to respect the other’s territory, waters and airspace.

The Abraham Accords expanded formal relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed by normalization arrangements involving Morocco and Sudan. The declaration emphasized peace, diplomatic relations, interfaith dialogue and economic cooperation. The signed text recognized the importance of maintaining and strengthening regional peace.

These agreements have endured because they serve regime interests. Egypt recovered territory and gained American support. Jordan obtained security cooperation, diplomatic access and economic benefits. Gulf monarchies gained technology, trade, intelligence coordination and a stronger position against Iran. Israel gained recognition and strategic depth.

The failed agreements of the region reveal the same rule. Ambiguous obligations, weak enforcement, divided leadership, territorial disputes and domestic political incentives can destroy diplomacy. Israeli governments, Palestinian authorities, Arab states, Iran and armed organizations have all avoided, reinterpreted or violated commitments when leaders believed doing so served their immediate interests.

Washington should therefore abandon character judgments and concentrate on enforcement. A government’s promises are credible when compliance is costly, observable and connected to durable interests. Personal assurances made at summits are the weakest form of evidence.

Israel’s Attempt to End the Aid Relationship

Israel’s place in American strategy is also approaching a major transition. The current model was designed when Israel possessed a smaller economy, faced conventional Arab armies and depended more heavily on American financial assistance. Israel now has an advanced defense industry, a powerful technology sector, nuclear deterrence, regional intelligence reach and growing commercial relationships with Arab states.

In February 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed phasing out the financial portion of American military assistance. “We can afford to phase out the financial component,” he said, calling for “a 10 year draw down to zero”.

The proposal would represent a profound change, but not necessarily a rupture. Netanyahu has described a future based on joint weapons development, intelligence, missile defense and advanced technology rather than annual grants. A House resolution introduced in June 2026 similarly called for replacing traditional assistance with mutual investment and shared development. The resolution’s sponsor said Israel had reached a stage at which the two countries should contribute and benefit more equally.

Ending financial aid would give Israel greater independence over procurement and military operations. It would also reduce Washington’s leverage. American assistance is not simply a transfer of money. Much of it returns to the United States through weapons purchases, sustains defense production and gives American officials influence over Israeli planning, even when that influence is inconsistently exercised.

The strongest case for gradual withdrawal is that a prosperous ally should not remain permanently subsidized. Israel would become a purchaser and partner rather than a dependent recipient. The strongest case against it is that joint defense programs, stockpiles, missile interception and emergency resupply benefit American regional strategy as well as Israel.

A responsible transition would separate direct subsidy from genuine joint security. Grants could decline while cooperation in missile defense, intelligence, cyber defense, research and weapons production continues through contracts in which both governments contribute identifiable value.

Israel’s greatest challenge will not be financial. Its relationship with the United States increasingly depends on the Palestinian conflict, civilian casualties, settlement policy and the changing attitudes of younger American voters. Financial independence may reduce arguments over aid conditions, but it cannot eliminate political disagreement over how Israeli power is used.

Israel and the Arab States Still Need Each Other

Arab governments may condemn Israel publicly while cooperating with it quietly on Iran, trade, water, intelligence and regional security. That apparent contradiction is not necessarily evidence of duplicity. Governments maintain several interests at once, and public legitimacy in Arab societies remains deeply connected to the Palestinian question.

Saudi Arabia illustrates the limit of normalization. Its leaders see potential value in Israeli technology, American security commitments and a regional alignment against Iran. Yet the Saudi Foreign Ministry has stated that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, Israeli operations in Gaza end and Israeli forces withdraw. The ministry described this as the kingdom’s firm position.

Whether Riyadh would preserve every element of that demand in a final negotiation is uncertain. Saudi rulers have strong reasons to obtain an American defense agreement and access to civilian nuclear technology. They also have reasons to avoid appearing to abandon the Palestinians in exchange for benefits from Washington.

Israel, meanwhile, cannot build a durable regional order entirely through intelligence ties with palaces. Agreements that lack public legitimacy may survive during calm periods but become politically expensive during war. The Abraham Accords demonstrated that normalization is possible without first resolving the Palestinian conflict. The years since have shown that the conflict still limits how far normalization can advance.

A viable regional system for the 2030s would connect Israeli recognition, Palestinian political reform, Arab investment, security guarantees and restrictions on Iranian expansion. None of those elements can succeed alone.

China Is Already Inside the American System

The most important outside power entering the region is not Russia. It is China. Beijing buys enormous quantities of Gulf energy, invests in ports and infrastructure, sells technology and generally avoids demanding political reform. Gulf governments increasingly prefer a diversified foreign policy in which Washington provides security while China provides markets, capital and diplomatic alternatives.

China’s 2023 mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran demonstrated the appeal of that approach. The two governments agreed in Beijing to restore diplomatic relations, reopen embassies and resume official contacts. China presented the agreement as a contribution to regional peace and security.

The agreement did not resolve the fundamental conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Tehran still maintains armed partners and ideological allies across the region. Riyadh still depends heavily on American weapons and security cooperation. What Beijing proved was narrower but important: Middle Eastern governments no longer regard Washington as the only capital capable of organizing diplomacy.

The Gulf states do not want to replace the United States with China. They want the ability to use each against the other. American protection gives them security. Chinese demand gives them revenue. Russian cooperation can influence energy markets. European investment offers technology and legitimacy.

Washington’s goal should not be to prevent every Chinese commercial relationship. That would be impossible and economically irrational. It should protect specific security interests by limiting Chinese access to sensitive military technology, communications networks, intelligence facilities and infrastructure that could support a permanent strategic presence.

American influence will decline if it is measured as exclusive control. It may remain substantial if it is measured as the ability to assemble coalitions, protect maritime routes, develop superior weapons and make agreements that regional governments cannot easily obtain elsewhere.

How to Determine Whether the New Leaders Are Frauds

The leaders shaping the Middle East’s future speak in the language foreign audiences want to hear. Al-Sharaa promises inclusion. Mohammed bin Salman promises moderation. Netanyahu promises a relationship based on equality rather than aid. Saudi diplomats promise regional integration after Palestinian statehood. China promises sovereignty and cooperation without interference.

None of those statements should be accepted or dismissed solely because of the speaker’s history. Credibility can be tested.

Al-Sharaa’s promises become credible when armed factions are vetted, minorities can organize politically, courts prosecute government fighters, the legislature restrains the presidency and elections can remove officials. His past makes skepticism necessary, but the conduct of his state must supply the verdict.

Mohammed bin Salman’s promises become credible when Saudi citizens can criticize policy without imprisonment, migrant workers can leave abusive employers, religious minorities can worship openly, capital punishment is narrowed and journalists no longer fear transnational repression. Investment figures and tourist arrivals cannot substitute for those tests.

Netanyahu’s aid proposal becomes credible when Israel adopts a funded schedule, assumes the financial burden and accepts that greater independence also means fewer expectations of automatic American resupply. A declaration of self reliance followed by continued demands for extraordinary assistance would expose the proposal as political theater.

Arab normalization proposals become credible when embassies open, trade continues during crises, security arrangements survive leadership changes and agreements contain transparent obligations. Israeli peace proposals deserve the same standard.

The mistake of previous American policy was not that Washington negotiated with authoritarian rulers, monarchies or former militants. Diplomacy frequently requires dealing with governments as they exist. The mistake was allowing access, weapons and personal relationships to replace independent verification.

An American Strategy for the 2030s

The United States should retain the ability to protect maritime commerce, prevent nuclear proliferation, defend its forces, support treaty allies and destroy terrorist organizations that threaten Americans. It should also reject the assumption that every regional dispute requires American ownership.

Syria should receive reconstruction access in stages. Sanctions relief should continue where it benefits civilians, while assistance to state institutions should depend on military vetting, minority protection, transparent trials and constitutional development. Washington should neither attempt to govern Syria nor hand unconditional legitimacy to its new president.

Saudi cooperation should concentrate on energy stability, counterterrorism, maritime defense and deterrence of Iran. Arms sales and advanced technology transfers should include enforceable protections against diversion, transnational repression and civilian abuse. Labor reform and the release of peaceful dissidents should become elements of security negotiations rather than ceremonial concerns raised after agreements are complete.

The relationship with Israel should evolve from permanent financial assistance toward reciprocal defense production and intelligence cooperation. Washington should preserve Israel’s ability to defend itself while requiring American weapons and diplomatic support to serve defined American interests. Friendship between countries does not require subsidy without an expiration date.

Immigration and integration policy should defend the sovereignty of Western constitutional law. Governments should block foreign financing that supports extremism, prosecute religious intimidation, protect criticism and conversion, and require civic integration. Those policies should target conduct and organizations rather than treating Muslim ancestry as evidence of disloyalty.

Treaties should contain benchmarks, inspection mechanisms, consequences and renewal provisions. Alliances should be reviewed based on what they accomplish, not how long they have existed. The United States should be willing to cooperate with imperfect governments, but it should stop rewarding partners merely for being less dangerous than their enemies.

The End of Sentimental Strategy

The Middle East of the 2030s will not be governed by a simple contest between democracy and dictatorship, Islam and the West, Arabs and Israelis, or America and China. It will be shaped by governments combining economic modernization with political control, religious identity with national interest, public hostility with private cooperation and historical grievance with practical necessity.

Ahmed al-Sharaa may prove that a militant commander can become a restrained national leader. The massacres, weak institutions and unvetted armed factions beneath his government provide ample reason for doubt. Saudi Arabia may become a wealthy, innovative and socially open country while remaining one of the world’s most politically restrictive monarchies. Israel may end American aid while deepening the military alliance that aid helped construct. Arab governments may expand relations with Israel while refusing to abandon Palestinian statehood. China may gain influence without acquiring the military burdens the United States has carried for decades.

America does not need to admire these governments to work with them. It does need to know what the work accomplishes.

The era of the blank check should end before the 2030s begin. American protection, weapons, trade and recognition should purchase verifiable conduct: open shipping lanes, enforced treaties, restrained military power, opposition to terrorism, protection of minorities and institutions capable of surviving the rulers who currently command them.

Anything less would leave Washington financing another generation of promises while the region’s governments prepare for a future built increasingly on their own terms.